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The world economy 
Overview 
Since the publication of our last Commentary in October 
2000 the prospects for the world economy have weak-
ened considerably. The principal development has been 
the rapid turnaround in the US economy. As recently as 
mid-November last year the consensus view was that 
real growth in the US in 2001 would slow to about 3.5%, 
roughly consistent with stable inflation. Higher oil prices 
and a general tightening of monetary policy were 
expected to lead to a more general slowing of the world 
economy, although most forecasters thought it unlikely 
that that by themselves these two factors will lead to a 
major global recession. 
Through late November and most of December there 
was growing concern that the US would suffer a more 
severe slowdown. In early December 2000, Alan 
Greenspan indicated that the emphasis in US monetary 
policy could well move away from further tightening 
towards reductions in interest rates. Later in the month 
the Federal Reserve confirmed this when the FOMC 
indicated that their assessment of the balance of policy 
risks had moved away from inflationary pressures 
towards the possibility of an over weak economy. On 
January 3 rd the Federal Reserve surprised financial 
markets when the FOMC cut the federal funds rate by 
0.5% ahead of their scheduled meeting at the end of 
the month. 
The general view now is that the US economy will 
probably slow down to a real growth rate of around 2% 
in 2001. US output accounts for about a quarter of 
world GDP so there is bound to be a major impact upon 
the global economy as a whole. However, the impact on 
the Euro zone is likely to be more muted for a number of 
reasons that we discuss below, though there is some 
concern that Asia will suffer more. 
Table 1 summarises forecasts for a number of the 
principal international indicators produced by the OECD 
in December 2000. These forecasts are the most 
recent to be produced by a major international eco-
nomic organisation, but it should be borne in mind that 
the preparatory work on the forecasts would have been 
done in November when and that they were published 
before the cut in US interest rates. 
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Table 1: Forecasts of main world economy indicators 
us 
Japan 
Euro zone 
Germany 
France 
OECD 
US 
Japan 
Euro zone 
Germany 
France 
OECD 
1999 
4.2 
0.2 
2.5 
1.6 
2.9 
3.0 
1999 
1.8 
-0.5 
1.2 
0.3 
0.7 
2.8 
% Growth in real GDP 
2000 
5.2 
1.9 
3.5 
3.0 
3.3 
4.3 
2000 
2.5 
-0.5 
2.2 
1.5 
1.5 
3.1 
2001 
3.5 
2.3 
3.1 
2.7 
2.9 
3.3 
2002 
3.3 
2.0 
2.8 
2.5 
2.5 
3.1 
Inflation rate 
2001 
2.1 
0.0 
2.3 
1.6 
2.1 
2.6 
2002 
2.2 
-0.1 
2.0 
1.6 
2.0 
2.2 
1999 
4.2 
4.7 
9.9 
8.3 
11.1 
6.7 
Unemployment rate 
2000 
4.0 
4.7 
9.0 
7.7 
9.7 
6.2 
2001 
4.2 
4.6 
8.3 
6.9 
8.8 
6.0 
2002 
4.5 
4.6 
7.7 
6.3 
8.2 
5.9 
Short term interest rate 
1999 
5.4 
0.2 
3.1 
3.1 
3.1 
n/a 
2000 
6.5 
0.2 
4.4 
4.4 
4.4 
n/a 
2001 
7.0 
0.6 
5.4 
5.4 
5.4 
n/a 
2002 
7.0 
0.9 
5.5 
5.5 
5.5 
n/a 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook, December 2000; inflation is calculated using the consumer expenditure deflator. 
Judged by current sentiment the US forecasts in Table 1 
are very optimistic. While the forecasts for other regions 
are also optimistic, they are more in line with current 
market expectations and they do illustrate a number of 
broad trends that are still relevant for the global 
economy: 
-> There will be a general slowdown in the OECD 
economies from the peak in 2000, with the 
slowdown in the US being sharper than that in the 
Euro zone; 
-> There are still some concerns about the balance 
between supply and demand in the Euro zone, 
although projected growth is roughly in line with the 
long term trend; and 
-> There is an expectation that economic activity in 
Japan will recover, although demand will remain 
significantly lower than potential supply. 
The causes of the global slowdown 
A number of factors have contributed to the expectation 
that the world economy will slow down in 2001 and 
2002: 
-> Oil prices have been rising through out most of 
1999 and 2000, although there has been some 
easing since late November 2000 when oil prices 
fell to about US$ 22 a barrel. We discuss the 
impact of energy costs in more detail below; 
-> Monetary policy in the US and Europe has been 
tightened over the past eighteen months following 
concerns about inflationary pressures. There is 
some evidence that these higher interest rates have 
started to reduce demand in both continents, 
although it is probable that the full impact will not 
be evident until well into 2001. The likely reduction 
in growth is sizeable, yet until very recently there 
was still some concern that demand will still 
outstrip supply leading to a further tightening in 
monetary policy if central banks are to hit their 
inflation targets; 
-> There are signs of weakness in asset prices, 
particularly in the US, and this may endanger the 
financial position of firms and households leading 
to reductions in demand. We discuss this in more 
detail below when we consider the US economy; 
and 
-> The impact of a US slowdown upon Europe and 
Asia. This is discussed in more detail below when 
we consider Europe and Japan. 
The impact of oil prices 
During 1999 oil prices rose steadily through from a low 
of $11 a barrel at the start of year to roughly $25 by the 
end as OPEC restricted production. In 2000 oil prices 
were characterised by greater volatility with a fall back 
to $22 in April as OPEC relaxed its production quotas. 
The price quickly started climbing again though, rising 
to $27 in June. After a small fall in August the price 
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peaked at just over $35 in September and was roughly 
constant until the end of November when it fell back to 
just over $20. 
The short-term future will probably be one of relatively 
high oil prices compared with the generally low levels 
seen between 1985 and 1999. In addition a lack of 
spare production capacity and in the US and most OPEC 
countries (apart from Saudi Arabia) suggests that there 
will be little scope to stabilise prices in the face of 
potential shortages. This means that the marked 
increase in the volatility of oil prices that we have seen 
during 2000 is likely to continue until new capacity can 
be brought on stream and stocks replenished. 
Most analysts agree that if oil prices were to stabilise at 
around $25 a barrel - a widely forecast figure - the 
impact on the world economy would be far less severe 
than was the case in the mid-1970s and between 1979 
and 1985. This is partly because when measured in 
real terms a $25 price tag would be significantly less 
than in the 1979-85 episode, even though it would be 
roughly comparable with the real price during the 1974 
oil crisis. 
Other reasons why the impact of higher oil prices would 
be less severe than in earlier episodes include: 
-> The world economy is now less dependent on oil 
than it was in the early 1980s as the ratio of oil 
demand to GDP has halved. The impact of a higher 
oil price on the general price level will have roughly 
halved too. In turn this means that reductions in 
real income in oil consuming regions will be less 
and so any knock on effects on consumption will be 
smaller; and 
-> The general move to inflation targeting means that 
monetary authorities are now far less likely to 
accommodate general price rises resulting from a 
higher oil price. As a result any oil price rise is less 
likely to become part of the wage price spiral. 
Nevertheless oil prices do have some impact upon 
economic activity. Estimates by the IMF using their 
world macroeconomic model MULTIMOD suggest that a 
permanent $5 increase in the price of oil would reduce 
world real GDP by about 0.3% per annum, with the 
impact upon both US and Euro zone real GDP being 
about 0.4% per annum. Inflation as measured by 
consumer prices would rise by about 0.5 percentage 
points in both areas. 
United States 
We now turn to the US economy where recent develop-
ments suggest that there is a higher probability of a 
hard landing than previously thought. It is probably fair 
to say that until early December 2000 most analysts 
were expecting that the upward trend in oil prices and 
monetary tightening would result in a reduction in US 
growth roughly of the magnitudes shown in Table 1. 
There was undoubtedly some concern that the expan-
sion in the US economy was not sustainable and that 
this could lead to a reversal that would end in a US 
recession. Yet there was no strong evidence that this 
recession was actually around the corner. 
More recently there have been three developments that 
suggest that a US recession is more likely: 
-> The dramatic nature in which monetary policy was 
based in early January when the US interest rate 
was cut between scheduled meetings of the FOMC 
and by 50 basis points, rather than the more usual 
25 points; 
-> There has been a general decline in equity markets 
that is far more widespread than the problems with 
high technology stocks seen earlier in 2000; and 
-> There are signs that spending on IT will be far 
weaker in the immediate future than over the past 
few years. 
The decline in share prices is particularly worrying given 
the size of the private sector financial deficit that has 
accumulated in the US over the past few years. Both 
companies and households have used part of the 
capital gains on equities to finance current spending or 
to back loans that have allowed spending in excess of 
income. Some analysts estimate that in 2000 the US 
private sector will have borrowed about 7% of GDP - with 
2.5% coming from the public sector and the remainder 
coming from outside the US. The real danger is that if 
the widespread reverses in equity prices continue, the 
ability of the US private sector to fund deficits of this 
size will be undercut. This will inevitably lead to sharp 
reductions in current spending as the private sector 
attempts to turn around their financial position. 
One factor behind the general rise in US equities over 
the past few years has undoubtedly been the expecta-
tions of long-term returns from productivity gains 
associated with IT and the "new economy". Growth in 
US investment in IT has been strong through most of 
the 1990s, with very strong growth since 1998 reaching 
annual rates of 25%. There are signs that this trend 
may now have been reversed: the growth rate in new 
electronics orders stopped rising in the second quarter 
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of 2000 and the most recent data shows a dramatic fall 
in the growth rate. Given that IT investment accounted 
for roughly 4% of US GDP in 1999, a significant decline 
in new orders would by itself have a sizeable direct 
impact upon US demand. If the links between IT and 
economy wide capital gains mentioned above are taken 
into account the overall impact is likely to be far 
stronger. 
Europe and the impact of a US slowdown 
The prospects for Europe look healthier than the US. 
The business cycle is generally thought to be at an 
earlier stage than that in the US. More importantly there 
is less evidence of imbalances between supply and 
demand in the European economies, although there are 
some concerns about future overheating as capacity 
constraints bite. In particular, the European Commis-
sion's business survey suggests that capacity utilisation 
is above normal in the Euro zone. The weak Euro and oil 
prices may also feed into future inflation. Despite this, 
GDP growth towards the end of 2000 has been less 
than expected by most forecasters and early GDP 
estimates suggest that the annual growth rate may be 
marginally lower than the forecast 3.5% shown in 
Table 1. 
A deeper US recession could influence the European 
economy through two principal mechanisms: 
-> A potential decline in European exports as US 
residents and companies reduced their spending 
Here the likely effects are quite small given that 
exports to the US account for about 2% of Euro 
zone GDP. Therefore, even a sizeable reduction in 
imports by the US would only have a moderate 
effect upon Europe. Of course, there could be 
additional second round effects resulting from a 
general decline in world trade as the effects of US 
recession rippled through the global economy; and 
-> The general reverses in equity markets in the US 
could spread to European equity markets. If they 
did, the consequences would probably be far less 
severe than in the US given that the private sector 
in Europe is in a much healthier position than in the 
US and the lower proportion of household wealth 
held in equities. 
It seems reasonable to expect that Europe would be 
relatively secure in the face of a deeper US recession. 
Japan 
There are signs that the Japanese economy started to 
recover in early 2000 with stronger output growth in the 
first half of the year. There have also been improve-
ments in industrial and consumer confidence that look 
set to continue. Most analysts suggest that the recovery 
will continue into 2002 although the recovery is ex-
pected to be relatively weak. New investment by the 
business sector should lead to a recovery in disposable 
income and personal consumption. The potential 
problems of the US economy and, in particular, a weak 
US demand for IT products could well mark down the 
speed of the Japanese recovery. There is an expectation 
that the deflation will continue, with the GDP deflator 
falling faster than the consumption deflator shown in 
Table 1. 
John Ireland 
11th January 2001 
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